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Abstract. Veriable electronic voting has been extensively researched
for over twenty years, but few protocols have achieved real-life deploy-
ment. A key impediment, we argue, is caused by the existing protocols'
universal reliance on the probity of the tallying authorities. This might
seem surprising to many people as dependence on tallying authorities has
been a de facto standard in the eld. However, this dependence is actually
a legacy inherited from traditional physical voting, one that has proved
problematic in the electronic context. In this paper, we propose a rad-
ically new concept called self-enforcing electronic voting, which refers
to voting systems that are free from reliance on any tallying authority.
This proposal goes signicantly further than all existing or proposed e-
voting systems. We explain the feasibility of this new approach, with
a theoretical denition of the system properties, a concrete engineering
design, a practical implementation, and real-world trial experiments. We
also highlight some open issues for further research.
1 Introduction
Self-enforcing security protocols are powerful, as they do not depend on any ex-
ternal authorities, and thus are much more secure and deployable than those that
do. Similarly, we dene self-enforcing electronic voting as a voting system that
does not depend on any external tallying authorities. By this denition, existing
e-voting protocols such as Helios [1] are not self-enforcing, as they universally
rely on tallying authorities.
The idea of depending on tallying authorities is a historic legacy. From the
beginning of voting, the perceived trustworthiness of the authorities has been
an important factor in persuading the general public to trust the vote tallying
process, at least when buttressed by the use of eective independent observers.
This tradition also carries over to e-voting, where existing voting protocols all
involve tallying authorities.
But, the theoretical assumption of trustworthy tallying authorities in e-voting
proves very tricky to implement. For example, in the recent deployment of the
Helios e-voting system in the Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), two prob-
lems were reported [1]. The rst is usability. For fairness and security, the UCL
election committee appointed tallying authorities from diversied backgrounds.
But, the chosen tallying authorities knew little about cryptography. They were
incapable of understanding and performing complex cryptographic operations,
and in reality had to rely on external crypto experts to perform the autho-
rization tasks. The second related problem is security. It was assumed that the
authorities were subject to a threshold control: each of them was responsible for
safeguarding a private key, and it took a quorum of authorities to be able to
tally the votes. However, it is possible that authorities might lose their private
keys, which could lead to a catastrophic result (the inability to complete the
tallying would in eect act as a Denial of Service attack to the entire election).
Hence, the election committee decided to centrally back up all of the tallying
authorities' private keys and entrust the copies to a notary public. Obviously,
the notary public was able to view all the secret votes, which completely defeats
the assumed threshold control.
2 Proposal
Our proposal is to eliminate the reliance on (allegdly) trustworthy tallying au-
thorities altogether. We call the resultant voting system self-enforcing electronic
voting.
Figure 1 portrays the evolution of voting technologies. From the beginning of
voting, central authority has been playing a pivotal role in instilling trust in the
tallying process (an issue which is neatly captured by a famous saying attributed
to Joseph Stalin: It's not the people who vote that count; it's the people who
count the votes). In the current e-voting deployment around the world (US,
India, Brazil, etc.), voters have to trust their e-voting machine completely, and
transitively have to trust the authority that certies the machine. Researchers
have been trying to apply cryptography to make these e-voting systems more
veriable. The current state of the art in the eld involves distributing trust
among several authorities using some cryptographic threshold scheme. This is an
improvement over relying on a single authority, but not a clean solution. Voters
have to trust the authorities do not collude but they cannot verify that this is
indeed the case. The mere fear that the authorities might collude to compromise
the election would have deterred many voters in the rst place. Against this
background, our vision of next generation e-voting is that the election will need
to be self-enforcing: free from reliance on any tallying authorities.
We now give a slightly more formal denition of self-enforcing e-voting. For
simplicity of explanation, we discuss just the case of a single-candidate election.
However, the denition can be easily generalized to multi-candidate elections.
Consider a machine that pre-computes a table of N electronic ballots before
the election. As shown in Table 1, each ballot contains two cryptograms repre-
senting: No and Yes (which correspond to numeric values 0 and 1 respectively
in our implementation). We thereby dene a (single-candidate) self-enforcing e-
voting system as one that satises the following properties.
1. Well-formedness  For each ballot, given ni or yi, it is easy for anyone to
verify that the given cryptogram is an encryption of one of the two values:
No and Yes.
Fig. 1. Evolution of voting technologies
2. Concealing  For each ballot, given ni without yi, or given yi without ni,
it is infeasible to compute whether the given cryptogram represents No or
Yes.
3. Revealing  For each ballot, given both ni and yi, it is easy for anyone to
compute which cryptogram represents No and which represents Yes.
4. Self-tallying  Given a set of choices of one arbitrary cryptogram from the
two on each of the N ballots, it is easy for anyone to compute the tally of
Yes.
Ballot no No_Cryptogram Yes_Cryptogram
i ni yi
1 n1 y1
: : : : : : : : :
N nN yN
Table 1. Pre-computed electronic ballots
3 Feasibility
In this section, we show the proposed system is feasible by addressing the fol-
lowing three questions: 1) is it possible? 2) how does it work? 3) is it practical?
The rst question is whether self-enforcing e-voting is theoretically possible.
We answer this question armatively. In particular, the DRE-i protocol (Hao,
Kreeger, 2011) as described in [2] fulls all of the above properties. However, the
DRE-i protocol is only one specic embodiment; there may be other methods to
realize "self-enforcing e-voting". Hence, in this paper, we will only discuss the
abstraction of system, focusing on the essence of the new proposal.
The second question is how does such a system work in practice. Given a
cryptosystem that satises the four properties, it is straightforward to apply
it to e-voting. As an example, let us consider an on-site voting system that
employs a touch-screen Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machine to records
votes. Before the election, the machine generates a table of N ballots as shown
in Table 1 (N should be signicantly bigger than the total number of eligible
voters).
During the election, each authenticated voter casts her vote in two stages.
First, the DRE machine displays an unused ballot with both cryptograms ini-
tially hidden. The voter touches one choice from the screen - say she chooses
No. The DRE machine reveals the value of the No_Cryptogram on the screen.
In stage two, the voter should either conrm or cancel the vote. If she chooses
conrm, the ballot is casted. If she selects cancel, she essentially performs the
auditing function. The machine must in this case reveal the other cryptogram.
With both cryptograms revealed, the ballot is counted as a dummy vote. Dummy
votes will not add to the tally. The voter will be assigned another unused ballot
and repeat the same two-stage process to vote.
In the above procedure, all the revealed cryptograms (including valid as well
as dummy votes) will be published on a public bulletin board and also printed
on the receipt. Based on the Well-formedness Property, anyone can verify that
the conrmed vote is either No or Yes. Based on the Concealing Property,
the single revealed cryptogram does not disclose the voter's choice, so the receipt
does not show how the voter had voted (this is to prevent coercion). However,
the same Concealing Property also implies that the DRE machine might cheat
 when one selects "No", the machine may display Yes_Cryptogram, and the
voter would not be able to tell the dierence (i.e., knowing that his vote had
been subverted). This is where the Revealing Property becomes useful. If the
machine cheats by switching the cryptograms, this will be caught when the
voter chooses to cancel (i.e., audit) the vote. Finally, the Self-tallying Property
ensures that when the election nishes, any member of the public is able to
tally the Yes votes without involving any tallying authorities. (Satisfying the
Self-tallying Property is the most dicult part in the design of a self-enforcing
voting system. The way that is achieved in [2] is based on a technique proposed
six years ago at SPW'06 [3].)
The third question  perhaps the most important and most dicult  is
whether the proposed system is practical. We answer this question positively
by presenting two real-world trial elections based on the self-enforcing e-voting
technology, as we detail in the following section.
4 Trial elections
Based on the DRE-i protocol specication in [2], we have developed a fully
functional self-enforcing e-voting system, and conducted two (admittedly rather
small scale) trial elections among members of the School of Computing Science
at the Newcastle University to elect the favorite chocolate and favorite cheese
in October, and November, 2011 respectively. (The two winners were Quality
Street and Wensleydale.) In total, 74 people participated our trials.
In both election trials, all participants were the sta and PhD students of
the Computing Science department of Newcastle University. The rst election
involved participants trying three types of chocolate and then voting for their
favourite avour. The second election involved participants trying three types of
cheese and then voting for their favourite type.
In both cases, participants were able to try the items on oer and then take
a random paper slip from a box placed next to the food. The food and the paper
slips were put in a room that was only accessible to the department sta and
PhD students. The slip contained a web address for on-line voting and a random
passcode. Each participant was free to take a random passcode, so voting was
anonymous. When participants had nished voting on-line, they were asked to
complete a questionnaire.
4.1 Chocolate Election
This trial was based on an implementation of the DRE-i protocol using a mul-
tiplicative cyclic group  the same underlying group as the Digital Signing Al-
gorithm (DSA). The voting trial had 39 participants. All participants casted a
conrmed vote. Four of them audited a ballot once (i.e., casted a dummy vote)
before conrming their votes. No voter audited more than once.
The feedback questionnaire consisted of 6 statements and respondents were
asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement on a Likert scale from 1 to
5 (i.e., strongly agree, agree, neural, disagree, strongly disagree). The
statements were as follows:
1. I understood how to vote.
2. Voting was easy.
3. I understood how to check my ballot had been recorded correctly.
4. Checking that my ballot had been correctly recorded was easy.
5. I understood why I was being asked to check ballots.
6. I felt condent that my vote had been recorded correctly.
The feedback questionaire was answered by 23 voters. One respondent did
not give an answer for statement 2; other than this, every respondent gave an
answer for every statement. The results are shown in Table 2
4.2 Cheese Election
The subsequent cheese election trial was conducted one month after the chocolate
election. For this trial, we changed the implementation to using an additive
cyclic group  the same underlying group as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signing
Algorithm (ECDSA). The basic DRE-i protocol remained the same, but the
implementation became more ecient and the size of the receipt signicantly
shorter.
The voting trial had 35 participants. All participants casted a conrmed vote,
and one voter audited a ballot once before conrming the nal vote. No voter
audited more than once.
Table 2. Feedback Questionaire on the chocolate election
Question Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree Average score
(nearest option)
1 13 7 3 0 0 1.57 (Agree)
2 10 7 3 2 0 1.86 (Agree)
3 7 6 5 4 1 2.39 (Agree)
4 4 2 7 7 3 3.13 (Neutral)
5 5 6 0 9 2 2.86 (Neutral)
6 7 7 3 4 2 2.43 (Agree)
The feedback questionaire consisted of 7 statements and respondents were
asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement on the same Likert scale as
before. The statements were as follows:
1. I understood how to vote.
2. Voting was easy.
3. I understood how to check my ballot had been recorded correctly
4. Checking that my ballot had been correctly recorded was easy.
5. I understood why I was being asked to check ballots.
6. I felt condent that my vote had been recorded correctly.
7. I felt condent that my vote was anonymous.
The questionaire was answered by 20 voters. Every respondent gave an an-
swer to every statement.
Table 3. Feedback Questionnaire on the cheese election
Question Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree Average score
(nearest option)
1 15 2 2 1 0 1.45 (Strongly agree)
2 12 1 6 1 0 1.80 (Agree)
3 4 9 2 5 0 2.40 (Agree)
4 2 4 6 7 1 3.05 (Neutral)
5 4 6 4 5 1 2.65 (Neutral)
6 5 6 6 3 0 2.35 (Agree)
7 7 5 6 1 1 2.20 (Agree)
5 User feedbacks and open issues
In the trials, we did not provide any manual to explain how to vote. The only
thing that was available to the voter is a slip that contains a voting website
URL and a random password. We wanted to see how far voters could go. The
feedback shows that users generally found the system intuitive to use  overall
86% of users stated that they well understood how to vote even without any
manual or prior training; 71% rated the voting procedure as "easy"/"very easy";
58% expressed their "condence"/"strong condence" that their votes had been
recorded correctly. Clearly, there is still a lot of room for improvement, but we
found the initial user feedbacks broadly encouraging.
So far our pioneering investigation on self-enforcing e-voting has increased
our belief that it has great potential. However, we have also identied a number
of open issues. (In fact, most of these issues are generally applicable to all e-
voting protocols, not specically to ours.)
1. Zero Knowledge Proofs  The Well-formedness Property requires using the
ZKPs to ensure the correct format of the ciphertext. Existing ZKPs tech-
niques can well support the rst-past-the-post type of voting (using the
1-of-n ZKP), but not the ranked choice voting. More research in this aspect
is much needed.
2. Receipts  Voters need to verify the receipt against the public bulletin board
to ensure the data match. However, the cryptographic data printed on the
receipt is essentially random. Comparing random data is trivial to a com-
puter, but tedious to a human. In our rst trial, about 43% users expressed
diculties in comparing receipts against the data on public bulletin board.
In the subsequent trial, we improved the implementation using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography to make the receipt signicantly shorter. But still 40% users
found it dicult to visually compare the receipt with the bulletin board.
This highlights a serious usability problem that has been generally ignored
in the past. An often-suggested solution is to apply some visual hashing
technique to transform the random data to a visual pattern. However, we
have not found a really good visual hashing algorithm that is suitable for
practical use. An alternative solution, as we propose, is to print the receipt
on a transparency, that the user can overlay on the computer screen to verify
that the data match identically.
3. Re-voting  Re-voting permits a voter to vote multiple times but ensures
that only the last vote counts. Although it appears to be a useful feature,
re-voting should be implemented with caution. This is because re-voting
essentially overwrites the previous vote, and thus invalidates the previous
receipt. Disputes may arise if the re-voting requests are not handled in a
publicly evident manner. We know it is possible to implement re-voting at
a polling station (as explained in [2]), but currently we do not know how to
do it securely in an entirely remote setting. (We notice that Helios allows
re-voting in an Internet election [1], but we have not seen detailed analysis
on how this was securely achieved.)
4. Anonymity  In our implementation, anonymity is achieved through physical
means: each voter takes a random password to vote. Of course, this solution
will not work in an entirely remote setting. The Helios system claims to
protect user's anonymity over the Internet by using pseudonyms [1]. But we
think that claim is incorrect  the server can still work out the matching
between the real user and the pseudonym. The problem of how to achieve
real anonymity in remote e-voting  without any physical means  is still
unsolved. In fact, we do not even know if the problem is solvable.
5. Auditing  If we allow voters to audit the system (i.e., voter-initiated au-
diting), how many of them would actually endeavor to do that? This is an
important question, but has been generally neglected in the past. For ex-
ample, we did not nd concrete data in the Helios paper [1]. Our own trials
indicated that  without any incentive scheme  only a very small percentage
of our voters had bothered to audit the system: only 7%. (And these were all
computer scientists, many of whom were particularly interested in security
and dependability.) This shows the necessity of employing dedicated audi-
tors (possibly from the representatives of dierent parties) for national-scale
elections. But still, we consider it important to set up incentive schemes to
encourage voters to audit the system. One specic example of the scheme is
suggested here as follows: if the voter chooses to audit the system, he will get
a charity token, and he will be free to donate it to one of the charities near
the exit of the polling station. We regard this simple solution as an especially
ethical form of so-called ethical bribery  we term it the Waitrose scheme
to acknowledge a similar charity program run by Waitrose food stores in the
UK.
6. Understandability  How does one get the general public to trust a system
that they know they do not understand, especially one whose use/reliance
on cryptography is all too invisible and mysterious to them? We do not yet
have a good answer to that, but the same question applies to all e-voting
schemes that involve cryptography.
7. Dependability  In conventional e-voting schemes, tallying authorities have
some error-correction capability: if some ballots are lost, the authorities may
decide to exclude the missing ballots and only tally the rest (of course, this
capability may be misused). By contrast, self-enforcing e-voting schemes are
free from tallying authorities (and hence free from any potential misuse), but
they naturally lose the external error-correction capability. As a result, all
electronic data on the public bulletin board must be precise and complete;
otherwise, the public verication of the integrity of the tally will fail. In
the extreme disastrous situation where electronic data on the bulletin board
is corrupted, the system will degenerate to the current e-voting products,
where the e-voting machine announces a tally at the end of election, but
the public are unable to verify it. In summary, self-enforcing e-voting has
bought its property of self-tallying at a cost of much higher dependability
requirements. We believe this is achievable, but further research is needed.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined a new design called self-enforcing electronic
voting. This addresses a critical problem in e-voting: ensuring the integrity of
the election tallying result when the e-voting machine is totally corrupted. And
this goal is achieved without any tallying authority involvement, which greatly
simplies the election management and organisation.
Our proposal is only the rst step in exploring a new direction in e-voting and
there are still a number of open issues to resolve, but we believe it has promising
potential of becoming the next-generation e-voting.
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